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Abstract—The paper presents details on fast and secure
GF (2m) multipliers dedicated to elliptic curve cryptography
applications. Presented design approach aims at high efficiency
and security against side channel attacks of a hardware multi-
plier. The security concern in the design process of a GF (2m)
multiplier is quite a novel concept. Basing on the results obtained
in course of conducted research it is argued that, as well
as efficiency of the multiplier impacts the efficiency of the
cryptoprocessor, the security level of the multiplier impacts the
security level of the whole cryptoprocessor. Thus the goal is to
find a tradeoff, to compromise efficiency, in terms of speed and
area, and security of the multiplier. We intend to secure the
multiplier by masking the operation, either by uniformization
or by randomization of the power consumption of the device
during its work. The design methodology is half automated. The
analyzed field sizes are the standard ones, which ensure that
a cryptographic system is mathematically safe. The described
architecture is based on principles of Mastrovito multiplication
method. It is very flexible and enables to improve the resistance
against side channel attacks without degrading the multiplier
efficiency.
Index Terms—Finite-field multiplication, side-channel attack,
arithmetic protection, elliptic-curve cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays due to infeasibility of breaking mathematically
secure cryptographic algorithm [10], in order to break cryp-
tographic systems, attackers develop more and more effi-
cient physical attacks (ways of tampering the systems) [2],
[20]. Noninvasive physical attacks are relatively cheap and
effective. By observation of power consumption or changes
in electromagnetic field of the device, the attacker is able
to discover a cryptographic key. The necessity of protecting
devices against those types of attacks – the side channel attacks
(SCA) [21] is of high importance. Many countermeasures
were already developed and research on this topic is still of
top interest [4], [5], [7], [14], [26]. With developement of
new countermeasures against SCA, new ways of tampering
cryptographic devices appear [27]. Cryptanalysts use more
and more effective statistical and learning methods in order
to correlate recorded emissions with the secret data, on which
the devices operates [2], [20].
In our research we consider elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) systems [13]. Generally, the ECC system has three
layers: protocol layer (ECC protocol operations), curve layer
(operations on points on the curve - primitive elliptic curve
operations), field layer (finite-field arithmetic, operations on
point coordinates). There are many protections developed for
two upper layers [7], but not at the finite field one. We argue
that protecting also the lowest layer will rend the system more
secure.
II. FINITE FIELD MULTIPLICATION AND ECC
Finite-field arithmetic units are the most critical units of
the ECC systems. There are different types of fields used, we
consider binary finite fields extensions (GF (2m)) of sizes rec-
ommended by National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST) [10].
In GF (2m) two basic operations are defined: addition
and multiplication [17]. The elements of GF (2m) can
be represented by different bases, we consider GF (2m)
elements represented by polynomial basis of the form
{1, x, x2, ..., xm−2, xm−1}. Thus addition is a very simple
operation, as it is a XOR operation. On the other hand, multi-
plication is regarded as a costly operation. The multiplication
requires performing two steps: large vector multiplication
a(x)b(x) and reduction of the result modulo irreducible poly-
nomial f(x) generating the field. There exist many algorithms
for performing binary field multiplication [1], [3], [6], [16],
[22]. They are either dedicated for specific applications or
developed in order to increase the arithmetic unit efficiency in
terms of speed, area or power consumption. We have decided
to analyse existing GF (2m) algorithms regarding not only
hardware efficiency but also advantages to security. After vast
analysis of the most popular GF (2m) algorithms [23], we
have determined the algorithm, which seems to be the most
suitable for our purposes. As the most suitable the Mastrovito
multiplication algorithm [19] was chosen. We intend to secure
arithmetic units against power analysis side channel attacks
(PA SCA) [18]. Power analysis attacks rely on analysis of
power consumed during operation of the device. The attacker
tries to correlate recorded emissions with the data, on which
the device operates. Our goal is to uniformise or randomise
the power consumption of a multiplier unit in such a way
that it is impossible to recognize the operation or establish its
time boundaries. We intend to do this via specific architecture
of the multiplier and algorithmic modifications. We do not
consider circuit level countermeasures against SCA due to the
assumption that the solution should be platform independent.
A. Mastrovito algorithm overview
In classic GF (2m) multiplication method one has to per-
form separately multiplication and reduction. In Mastrovito
method [19] those two steps are combined. Let A be a
matrix representing operand a and b be a vector representing
operand b. Operands a and b are elements of GF (2m). Then
c = ab mod f = Ab mod f = (AL +AHR)b =Mb,
where AL, AH matrices are, respectively, lower and upper
parts of matrix A (which represents operand a) and R is so
called reduction matrix. Matrix M is called the Mastrovito
matrix.
III. MULTIPLIER ARCHITECTURE DESIGN IDEA
The most problematic aspect of Mastrovito algorithm is the
manipulation of matrix M . Let us consider a field of size
m = 233, matrix M is then of size 233× 233, which is about
54289 bits, thus storing it requires huge amount of resources.
Furthermore, due to its dependency not only on f(x), which
is fixed for given field, but also on operand a, matrix M
needs to be recomputed each time the multiplier is used. There
exist few methods for computation of matrix M coefficients.
Regarding properties of considered fields we have decided to
use such an equation: M = (AL+AHR). In our case matrix R
(reduction matrix) has a small number of nonzero coefficients
and matrices AH , AL are triangle matrices.
Our idea is to partition matrix M into 16 × 16-bit sub-
matrices and to design submultipliers, which will on-the-
fly calculate coefficients of selected submatrix of M and
multiply the submatrix by the proper 16-bit word of vec-
tor b. Submultiplier units compute partial vectors ci,j , where
i, j = 0, 1, . . . , m16 . Final result, vector c, is a concatenation of
ci,j words: c = c0 & c1 & c2 & · · · & c(m16−1) & cm16 ,
where:
c0 = c0,0 ⊕ c0,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ c0,m16 =
=M(0,0)b0 ⊕ M(0,1)b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ M(0,m16 )bm16
c1 = c1,0 ⊕ c1,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ c1,m16 =
=M(1,0)b0 ⊕ M(1,1)b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ M(1,m16 )bm16
...
cm
16
= cm
16 ,0
⊕ cm
16 ,1
⊕ · · · ⊕ cm
16 ,
m
16
=
=M(m16 ,0)b0 ⊕ M(m16 ,1)b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ M(m16 ,m16 )bm16 ;
⊕ designates addition in GF (2), that is xor and expression
M(i,j)bj denotes multiplication of submatrix of M by a word
of b. In the following paragraphs we will present details on
the design process of the GF (2283) multiplier. In the process
we have to derive equations for each submultiplier unit. At
first, in order to create each submatrix submultiplier we have
to derive equations for computation of coefficients of each
submatrix Mi,j . Then, we have to identify submatrices of
similar structures and design as many different submultipliers
as necessary. It occurs that some submatrices of M are
constructed in a similar way (are built of similar parts of
vectors a, f ) and require similar manipulation in order to
obtain partial solution ci,j .
As an example we present equations derived for submatrices
Mi,j for i = 0 and j = 0, 1, . . . , 17:
M0,0 = A
H
0 R0 ⊕AH1 R1 ⊕AL0
M0,1 = A
H
1 R0 ⊕AH2 R1
...
M0,15 = A
H
15R0 ⊕AH16R1
M0,16 = A
H
16R0 ⊕AH17R1 ⊕AH0 R4
M0,17 = A
H
17R0 ⊕AH0 R5
Matrix A and its decomposition into submatrices AH and
AL for m = 283, is presented below, where ALi , A
H
i ,
i = 0, 1, . . . , 17 are 16× 16-bit blocks of matrices AL, AH :

AL0 0 0 . . . 0 0
AL1 A
L
0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . . . . .
. . .
...
AL16 A
L
15 A
L
14 . . . AL0 0
AL17 A
L
16 A
L
15 . . . AL1 AL0
AH0 A
H
1 A
H
2 . . . AH16 AH17
0 AH0 A
H
1 . . . AH15 AH16
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . AH0 AH1
0 0 0 . . . 0 AH0

⇒

AL
AH

Matrix R partitioning for m = 283 is as follows:
R 0 1 2 3 · · · 14 15 16 17
0 R0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 R4 R5
1 R1 R0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0
2 0 R1 R0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 R1 R0 · · · 0 0 0 0
... 0 0 0 R1
. . . 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0
. . . R0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 R1 R0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 R1 R0 0
17 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 R1 R0
,
where R0, R1, R4, R5 are 16 × 16-bit submatrices of matrix
R, fields marked with zeroes designate submatrices with all
coefficients equal to 0.
One can observe that the following types of submultipliers
are needed: AHk R0, A
H
k R1, A
H
k R4, A
H
k R5, where k =
0, 1, . . . , 17. In next step the equations for those submultipliers
are derived and optimized. It will be shown how it is done on
the example of AkR0 submultiplier.
Lets simplify the case and assume, just to illustrate the
procedure, that M0,1 = AH1 R0. In order to derive equations
one has to know how AH1 and R0 matrices are constructed.
Derived equations are as follows:
M0,0( 0) =a(30 downto 15)⊕ a(25 downto 10)⊕ a(23 downto 8)⊕
a(18 downto 3);
...
M0,0( 3) =a(27 downto 12)⊕ a(22 downto 7)⊕ a(20 downto 5)⊕
a(15 downto 0);
M0,0( 4) =a(26 downto 11)⊕ a(21 downto 6)⊕ a(19 downto 4);
...
M0,0( 8) =a(22 downto 7)⊕ a(17 downto 2)⊕ a(15 downto 0);
M0,0( 9) =a(21 downto 6)⊕ a(16 downto 1);
M0,0(10) =a(20 downto 5)⊕ a(15 downto 0);
M0,0(11) =a(19 downto 4);
...
M0,0(15) =a(15 downto 0); ,
where M0,0(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , 15, is the i-th column of
submatrix M0,0. The last step is to create architectures for
submultipliers computing partial product ci,j . Partial product
ci,j is the result of multiplication of submatrix Mi,j and bj (16-
bit word of vector b), where i, j = 0, 1, . . . , 17 for m = 283.
Partial product ci,j for 16-bit wide row i = 0 is computed as
follows:
c0,0 =M0,0(0)b( 0)⊕M0,0(1)b( 1)
⊕ · · · ⊕M0,0(15)b(15);
c0,1 =M0,1(0)b(16)⊕M0,1(1)b(17)
⊕ · · · ⊕M0,1(15)b(31);
...
c0,16 =M0,16(0)b(256)⊕M0,16(1)b(257)
⊕ · · · ⊕M0,0(15)b(271);
c0,17 =M0,17(0)b(272)⊕M0,17(1)b(273)
⊕ · · · ⊕M0,17(15)b(287);
Then c0 (16-bit word of c) is as follows:
c0 = c0,0 ⊕ c0,1 ⊕ c0,2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ c0,15 ⊕ c0,16 ⊕ c0,17.
Final result c is computed, as shown at the beginning of the
section, as a concatenation of partial products ci.
In this work we describe multipliers for field of sizes m =
233, 283, 409. The method can be applied for other field sizes.
It is half automated. Necessary equations are derived using a
software application. Having the equations, one may design
the submultiplier units. The method was at first applied for
m = 233 and then extended for other fields.
On Figure 1 the architecture of the multiplier is presented,
where blocks M0,M1, . . . ,M5 are submultiplier units. The
work of all submultipliers is scheduled by a finite-state ma-
chine (FSM). The submultiplier units can be used in arbitrary
order, due to the fact that submatrices and partial results ci,j
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Fig. 1. Architecture of the multiplier
are independent of each other. There exist many variations of
submultiplications schedule.
We have automated the method for deriving equations
needed to design submultipliers, however the optimization
needs to be done by the designer. Performed optimization
impacts efficiency and security, thus it is the designer who
decides, which feature is more important. The method for ”in-
serting” countermeasures against SCA is also half automated.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our first concern was the multiplier’s efficiency in terms
of speed and area. After many tests we have finally come up
with an FSM schedule and structure of the multiplier (number
of submultiplier instances used, number of FSM states, etc),
which yielded satisfying hardware efficiency. Table I presents
implementation results of the three analysed multipliers on
Virtex-6 xc6vlx240t. The table presents results reported by
Xilinx ISE 12.2 environment. Number of clock cycles given in
the table is the total number of cycles required by a multiplier
to initialize all registers, fetch data and provide the result,
they were recorded basing on performed circuit simulation.
The total number of clock cycles required just for a finite
field multiplication is 56 clock cycles, in case of the second
version of multiplier for m = 409 it is 202 cycles. In Table II
the exemplary existing solutions are presented, basing on AT
factor (area× operation time), we may compare them with
ours. Due to the fact that authors of other solutions define
area in many different manners, the most popular unit is slice,
in order to be able to do a comparison we have estimated
TABLE II
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS OF VARIOUS EXISTING SOLUTIONS
Multiplier device reported slices clock frequency / mult. AT(type, m) area (Xilinx) critical path delay time [µ s] [slice × µ s]
[9]
Folded 933 LUT
m=233 Xilinx FPGA 699 FF 466 165.8 MHz 2.8 1311.2
Pipelined probably 216923 LUT
Architecture xc2v-6000 108578 FF 108461 167.2 MHz 0.012 1297.4
m=233 RAM blocks
[12]
classical 37296 LUT 18648 1˜3 ns 3.03 56484.8
m=233 37552 FF (7˜7 MHz)
Karatsuba 11746 LUT 5873 11.07 ns 2.6 15148.3m=233 xc2v-6000 13941 FF (90.33 MHz)
Massey Omura -ff1517-4 FPGA 36857 LUT 18428 15.91 ns 3.7 68315m=233 8543 FF (62.85 MHz)
Sunar,Koc 45435 LUT 22717 10.73 ns 2.5 56795.8m=233 41942 FF (93.20 MHz)
[25] m=191 XCV2600E 8721 8721 N/A 82.4 718610.4
[8]
m=210 xcv-300e-6 334 334 N/A 2.21 738.1
m=233 xc2v-6000-4 415 415 N/A 2.42 1004.3
m=239 xcv-300e-6 385 385 N/A 2.47 950.9
[15] m=210 xcv1000e 343 [4] 343 17.1 MHz 12.3 4218.9420 [7] 420 5166
[11] m=239 xcv-300e-6 347(359) 347 75 MHz 3.1 1075.7
[11]
m=120 603 603 88.47 MHz 1.36 817.9
m=240 1211 1211 57.99 MHz 4.14 5011.91203 1203 41.41 MHz 5.8 6972.2
m=480 2426 2426 59.03 MHz 8.1 19726.9v1000fg680-6 2403 2403 18.52 MHz 25.9 62280.8
m=720 3641 3641 56.83 MHz 12.7 46129.23603 3603 12.64 MHz 56.9 205234.2
m=1080 5458 5458 54.61 MHz 19.8 107940.75403 5403 8.4 MHz 128.6 694671.4
[28]
m=163 504 LUT 252 1.78 ns 0.29 73.08g=1 500 FF
m=163 1179 LUT 589 2.36 ns 0.035 20.62g=11 495 FF
m=163 7176 LUT 3588 3.54 ns 0.007 25.12g=82 Virtex-5 495 FF
m=571 1731 LUT 865 1.85 ns 1.056 913.44g=1 V5LX110-3 1727 FF
m=571 8051 LUT 4025 2.78 ns 0.067 269.68g=24 1720 FF
m=571 10350 LUT 5175 2.98 ns 0.054 279.45g=32 1720 FF
TABLE I
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS OF OUR BASIC NOT-SECURED MULTIPLIERS
FOR m = 233, 283, 409
Algorithm area [slices] f [MHz] clock cycles AT
Mastrovito 233 940 297 75 237.37
Mastrovito 283 1112 187 75 445.99
Mastrovito 409 a 1648 175 75 706.28
Mastrovito 409 b 1149 187 221 1357.9
number of equivalent slices for each multiplier. We have
assumed the following approximations for given devices: 1
slice = 2 LUT; except for Virtex-5 where 1 slice = 4 LUT.
It is difficult to compare existing solutions. It is not always
said if the results are for the entire device i.e. multiplier
with the control of inputs and outputs or just for the core of
arithmetic operator. One can implement described multipliers,
however usually not all implementation details are given
and explained. Moreover implementation results depend on
software environment used and depend greatly on the manner
of coding. The other problem is that in the newest solutions
authors tend to implement their multipliers on ASIC devices.
We find that it is impossible to reliably compare solutions
implemented on FPGA devices with solutions implemented
on ASIC devices. Thus the Table II may lack some recent
solutions.
In order to introduce countermeasures against SCA we
had to analyse the activity of the multiplier and define its
weaknesses. By analysing activity we mean simulation and
analysis of instantaneous power consumption of the multi-
plier [29]. We have performed hardware simulations and later
current measurements, in order to verify if our assumptions
regarding hardware simulation of the device behaviour were
correct. In the paper we will mainly present results of hardware
simulations due to the fact that they fairly model the device
behaviour [24]. All presented traces are exemplary traces of
random multiplications. Traces are not averaged in order to
demonstrate their characteristics properly. Averaged traces are
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Fig. 2. Activity simulation results for random GF (2m) multiplications for
basic multipliers.
more uniform.
A. Activity simulation
The activity of the multiplier was simulated with Chip-
ScopePro tool. We had inserted the activity monitors [24],
which count number of signals changing state (1→ 0, 0→ 1)
in one clock cycle. The activity for each clock cycle is
recorded, plotted with use of ChipScopePro tool and analysed.
On Figure 2 we present the activity recorded for series of
GF (2m) multiplications of random operands performed using
the three presented multipliers. ChipScopePro tool enables to
record the activity during the device work. For m = 409 we
present two versions of original multiplier, in the first one
multiplication lasts 56 cycles as in case of others, in the second
one 202 cycles. The shape of the activity trace is very specific
(step-wave shape) and allows by simple observation to define
operation time boundaries. We argue that this may allow to
recognise some upper layer operations (operations on points
of the curve 2P or P +Q).
The hardware simulation with ChipScopePro tool gives
results very close to those obtained during current measure-
ments. Software simulation (e.g. using ModelSim) does not
adequately simulate all conditions, which may occur during
device operation.
B. Architecture advantages to security
The specific behaviour of the multiplier is due to its specific
architecture. The multiplier is built of various submultipliers
operating on vectors of different sizes. The basic schedule of
the submultiplier unit operation assumes starting all units at
once. Thus, if some units are utilised more than the others the
number of units utilised in one state gradually decreases e.g.
at first we are using 7 units, later 5 and at the end only 2.
Concluding, at the beginning the activity is higher and then
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Fig. 3. Uniformization examples
decreases with time.
However, the schedule of subunits operation is very flexible.
Operations on submatrices as well as submultipliers are inde-
pendent of each other. Such architecture’s flexibilty enables to
adapt the units to our needs.
Regarding security we have defined two architecture/schedule
modification goals: the uniformization of the multipliers’ activ-
ity and the randomization of the multipliers’ activity. We have
simulated many versions of the multipliers and we present
here exemplary ones. Presented architecture is very flexible
and can be adapted to different requirements.
V. MODIFICATIONS EXAMPLES
Modification of submultiplier units operation schedule al-
lows activity trace uniformization and randomization. We
have performed various modifications of the schedule and
obtained promising results for both type of activity masking.
Figures 3, 4 present the most interesting, according to us,
results obtained for activity uniformization and randomization
for m = 233, 283, 409. On some activity traces there are
visible drops to zero, which maybe informative as they may
allow to establish operation time boundaries. Those drops
appear mostly due to features of the algorithm controlling the
multiplier activity tests. In order to distinguish each operation
we had designed the control in such a way, that there is a clear
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Fig. 4. Randomization examples
pause between each operation. Later we have redesigned the
control in order to omit unnecessary pauses.
In case of uniformization, we had tried to uniformize
number of bits/signals that change state in every clock cycle. It
was done in half automated manner. A programme generates
exemplary schedule, basing on the number of bits on which
each submultiplier operates, and then it has to be verified
in hardware. Due to the fact that submultipliers operate on
vectors of various sizes it is not an easy task, however, as
presented on second from the top plot on Fig. 3 it is possible
to obtain satisfying results. The example of uniformization
procedure for m = 233 is presented in Table III. Left
part presents original schedule and right part a new one. In
the Table, it is presented which multipliers are used in a
certain state (multipliers used column) and the total number
of bits/signals changing in that state is given (bits column).
One can observe that standard deviation of maximal number
of signals changing state in a given clock cycle in uniformized
schedule is 7 while in original schedule it was 71.
The case is different for randomization. In order to ran-
domize multiplication activity, we had tried many approaches.
The best results gave the solution in which every submultiplier
has its separate, independent of other controlling FSM, which
starts scheduling submultiplications in a different moment of
time. The starting sequence, the order in which submultipliers
are turned on, is variable. The crucial point was to design a
method, which will allow generating random/variable starting
sequence. The goal was to make the starting sequence random
but not to introduce too many additional units. The best
solution was to use a single LFSR register or a combination
of LFSR registers and control them with certain bits of input
operands a, b .
The efficiency of proposed protections was one of the most
important goals in our research however while analysing
the countermeasures we have kept in mind that protections
cannot reduce the efficiency in terms of speed and area of
the multiplier. In Table IV we present implementation results
of our Mastrovito multipliers. As uni1, uni2 we denote first
and second uniformisation example for a given field size (see
top, bottom plot accordingly for each field size on Figure 3)
and rand1 denotes randomisation example for a given field
size presented on Figure 4. Analysing implementation results
TABLE IV
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS OF OUR EXEMPLARY SECURED MULTIPLIERS
FOR m = 233, 283, 409 COMPARED WITH THEIR NOT-SECURED VERSIONS
Algorithm area [slices] f [MHz] cycles AT [slice × us]
Mastrovito 233 940 297 75 237.37
uni1 865 414 75 156.7
uni2 972 225 48 207.36
rand2 975 319 avg.80 244.51
Mastrovito 283 1112 187 75 445.99
uni1 1085 223 75 364.91
uni2 1043 219 75 357.19
rand2 1113 220 avg.78 394.6
Mastrovito 409 1648 175 75 706.28
uni1 1532 175 75 656.57
uni2 1537 217 75 531.22
rand2 1586 217 avg.74 540
presented in Table IV one may observe that for greater field
sizes the area grows proportionally. Basing on the results
obtained for m = 233 we have decided to use in all multipliers
in primary version a controlling FSM with 56 states. However,
in order to reduce area one may increase number of states
of controlling FSM and decrease number of instances of
submultipliers. Moreover in such architecture as proposed,
protections do not alter significantly the multiplier efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the paper we have presented the idea for the architecture
of hardware GF (2m) multiplier design based on Mastrovito
algorithm principles. The architecture is very flexible. It is
efficient and allows introducing countermeasures against SCA.
Due to similarity of structure of multiplier for field sizes
defined as secure, m = 233, 283, 409 basing on already
obtained results we may say that it is possible to find efficient
and secure against side channel power analysis solutions. The
specific architecture allows introducing SCA countermeasures
without adding excessive overhead. As far as we are concerned
the design of the finite-field arithmetic units with security
concern is a new idea, which may contribute to the security
of ECC systems.
Presented hardware multipliers efficiency is satisfying,
moreover, first results concerning their security seem also
satisfying. With such arithmetic units it should be harder
to recognise higher level elliptic curve operations such as
doubling or addition of points of the curve.
As the multipliers are intended to be a part of a cryp-
tographic system we plan to conduct intensive protection
evaluations using attacks. The attacks should verify how
finite field operation protections influence the security of the
system. The presented countermeasures are not autonomous
countermeasures thus they should be verified in conjunction
with other ECC system countermeasures.
TABLE III
UNIFORMIZATION EXAMPLE FOR m = 233
state multipliers used bits state multipliers used bits
0 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 0 m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m9 281
0a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 0a m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
0b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 0b m0 1 m1 mr mc m4 275
0c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 0c m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 m9 289
1 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 1 m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 281
1a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 1a m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
1b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 1b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 281
1c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 1c m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
2 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 =⇒ 2 m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
2a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 2a m0 1 m1 mc m0 2 m4 282
2b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 2b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
2c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 2c m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
3 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 3 m0 1 m1 mc m5 m9 282
3a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr mc 384 3a m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
3b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 mr 336 3b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
3c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 3c m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
4 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 4 m0 1 m1 mc m5 m9 282
4a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 4a m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
4b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 4b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
4c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 4c m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
5 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 5 m0 1 m1 mr mc m0 2 m5 307
5a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 5a m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
5b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 5b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
5c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 5c m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
6 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 =⇒ 6 m0 1 m1 mc m0 2 m4 282
6a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 6a m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
6b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 6b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
6c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 6c m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
7 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 7 m0 1 m1 mr mc m0 2 m9 307
7a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 7a m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
7b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 7b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m9 281
7c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 7c m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
8 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 8 m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
8a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 8a m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
8b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 8b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m9 281
8c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 m0 2 296 8c m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
9 m0 1 m1 m5 m4 249 9 m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
9a m0 1 m1 m5 m4 249 9a m0 1 m1 mc m5 m9 282
9b m0 1 m1 m5 m4 249 9b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
9c m0 1 m1 m5 m4 249 9c m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
10 m0 1 m1 m5 m9 234 =⇒ 10 m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
10a m0 1 m1 m5 m9 234 10a m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m9 281
10b m0 1 m1 m5 m9 234 10b m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m9 281
10c m0 1 m1 m5 m9 234 10c m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
11 m0 1 m1 m5 m9 234 11 m0 1 m1 mc m5 m9 282
11a m0 1 m1 m5 m9 234 11a m0 1 m1 m0 2 m5 m4 296
11b m0 1 m1 m5 m9 234 11b m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
11c m0 1 m1 m5 m9 234 11c m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
12 m0 1 m1 m5 m9 234 12 m0 1 m1 mc m5 m9 282
12a m0 1 m1 m9 172 12a m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
12b m0 1 m1 m9 172 12b m0 1 m1 mr m5 m4 289
12c m0 1 m1 m9 172 12c m0 1 m1 mc m5 m9 282
13 m0 1 m1 m9 172 13 m0 1 m1 mc m0 2 m4 282
13a m0 1 m1 m9 172 13a m0 1 m1 mc m0 2 m4 282
13b m0 1 m1 m9 172 13b m0 1 m1 mr mc m0 2 m5 307
13c m0 1 m1 110 13c m0 1 m1 mc m0 2 m4 282
standard deviation : 71, range =274 standard deviation : 7.6, range = 32
No. of bits used by each multiplier: m0 1 = 47; m1=63; mr=40; mc=48; m0 2=47; m5=62; m4=77; m9=62
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